π. ππ―ππ‘π¦π±π¦π¬π«ππ© ππ«π‘ 'ππ¬π‘π’π―π«' ππ¬π²π«π‘ππ±π¦π¬π«π© ππ¦π’π΄ππ¬π¦π«π±π°
ππ₯π’π―π’ have always been many possible approaches to the philosophical problems raised by mathematics – empiricism, Platonic realism, intellectualism, intuitionism, formalism, and many other intermediate possibilities. From what we have seen, one many expect to find, among 19th-century German mathematicians, an influence of philosophical ideas and a greater speculative tendency then among their foreign colleagues. Interesting early examples that will not be discussed in detail here are those of Bolzano and Kummer. But more relevant for our purposes is the fact that the influence of philosophy seems to have led to an increase of intellectualist view points in 19th-century Germany.
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| Immanuel Kant 1724 — 1804 |
πππ«π±π¦ππ« philosophy has always been more congenial to scientists then idealism, so it is not surprising that during and after the acme of idealism it retained an importation status among them. A characteristic Kantian idea is that the subject (the philosophical I) enjoys a central position in the world, or at least in our knowledge of the world. The world is regarded as a representation, a set of phenomena that unfold in the screen of consciousness. Such phenomena are not simply determined by the stimuli coming from external objects, but also by some intrinsic characteristics of the subject's mind. This situation of the representational world as codetermind by subject and objects may be seen as parallel to that of scientific theories, when viewed from the hypothetico-deductive standpoint, since theories are codetermind by mathematically stated hypotheses and laboratory experiences. If we accept this parallelism, and take the conclusion that arises from it, we should come to think that mathematics is on the side of the subject. It should be related to the intrinsic characteristics of the subject or, to use Kant's phrase, to the a priori in the subject's mind, and we thus arrived at an intellectualist's conception.
βπ«π±π’π©π©π’π π±π²ππ©π¦π°πͺ can be found in association with several different conceptions of the foundations of mathematics in early 19th-century Germany. Two examples are Kantian intuitionism, and also a brand of formalism linked to the so-called natorial school. Let us begin with the later.
π.π. ππ¬π―πͺππ©π¦π°π± ππππ―π¬ππ π₯π’π°
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| Gottfried Wilhelm Liebniz 1646 – 1716 |
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| Martin Ohm 1792 – 1872 |
In the most diverse phenomenon of the calculus (of arithmetic, algebra, analysis, etc.) the auther sees, not properties of quantities, but properties of operations, that is to say, actions of the understanding... It turns out that one only calculates with "forms," that is, with symbolized operations, actions of the understanding that have been suggested... by the consedration of the abstract whole numbers.⁴
ππ₯π’ general symbolic rules, therefore, represent mental actions performed on mentally existing forms or symbols. Ohm's mention of operarions that are suggested by the consideration of whole numbers is a reference to the so-called "principle of permanence of formal laws" which is also charecteristics of British symbolical algebra, and can be found much later in the work of Hermann Hankel [1876].
βπ¬πͺππ¦π«ππ±π¬π―π¦ππ©π¦π°πͺ was very successful until about 1810, but text books of that orientation continued to be published up to the mid-century. Ohm's approach, on the other hand, seems to have been widely influential among Gymnasium teachers and those who were more or less self-educated in mathematics.⁵ As late as 1860, the GΓΆttingen professor Mortiz A. Stern published a textbook in which formalistic conceptions akin to Ohm's were central (see[Jahnke 1991]), several ideas strongly reminiscent of Ohm's can be found in early writings of Dedekind, perhaps coming through his teacher Stern, and in Weierstrass, apparently trough his teacher C. Gudermann [Manning 1975, 329 – 40].
An intellectualist conception of mathematics, couched in the language of 'forms,' can also be found in Hermann Grassmann. Grassmann [1844, 33] began his work by elaborating a general theory of forms [Formenlehre] as a frame for mathematics. The transition from one formula to another he regarded as a strictly parallel to a conceptual process that should happen simulateniously [op.cit., 9]. A form, or "form of thought," was simply an object posited by thought as satisfying a certain definition, a "specialized being generated by thought," And "pure mathematics is the doctrine of forms" [op. cit., 24]. This new, abstract conception of mathematics is related with the influence of several philosophers, from Liebniz to Schleiemacher, on Grassmann.⁵ Although he accepted the existence of an spatial intuition, Grassmann's Ausdehnungslehre was not dependent upon intuition, since it constituted the abstract, purely mathematical foundation for geometry, which is empirical. Despite similarities with the combinatorialists and Ohm, Grassmann abandoned excessive reliance upon the symbolical, and more specifically he abandoned reasoning founded upon analogy, thus going in the modern direction. Incidentally, it is worth nothing that his approach promoted, like no other in eaely 19th-century Germany, a formal axiomatic structuring of mathematical theories.
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| Friedrich Schleiermacher 1768 – 1834 |




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